By Peter Main
As in Russia, the restoration of capitalism in Ukraine allowed the rise of ‘oligarchs’ who plundered the country’s wealth via privatisation. In both countries, corruption became woven into the fabric of society. Putin dealt with this by a combination of co-option and elimination but, when Ukraine opted to apply for membership of the EU, Brussels made outlawing corruption an explicit precondition.
The result was the creation of two anti-corruption bodies, independent of the Kyiv government: the National AntiCorruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) and the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO).
In July, the Verkhovna Rada, Ukraine’s parliament, voted to end the independence of these bodies and transfer their powers to the government. Volodymir Zelensky signed the proposal into law the very sameday—prompting anti-government demonstrations within hours.
The protests spread to cities across the country, with 10,000 protesting right outside Zelensky’s office the next day. In a country fighting for its very survival, such a response is practically unprecedented and immediately threatened the ‘social peace’ that Putin’s invasion had promoted.
Two days later, a Bill to restore the independence of NABU and SAPO was introduced into parliament—and was adopted with the support of 331of the parliament’s 401 members.
The fact that it is difficult to imagine such events in Russia underlines the continued vibrancy within Ukrainian society. That points to the potential for popular, possibly armed resistance to the imposition of any pro-Russian ‘peace’ deal. Putin and Trump may arrogantly ignore Zelensky; they may find it more difficult to ignore the Ukrainians.
