By James Rogers
THE LAST two months have been the most important period in the history of the Portuguese revolution. With the ruling class preparing for further attacks, the situation now hangs in the balance. The working class and rank and file soldiers must strengthen and extend the mass movement which grew up in response to the Sixth Provisional Government’s attacks. They must turn this fight into an offensive for workers’ power and socialism, or the Portuguese people face a bloody return to fascism.
When the Sixth Provisional Government took over at the end of September, its programme promised a crackdown on ‘indisicpline’ in the army, respect for private property, censorship of the media and the breaking up of all private militias, meaning armed workers’ and left organisations. To back up these moves, it attempted to set up a reliable security force, AMI (Military Intervention Group), as an alternative to the ‘too left-wing’ COPCON.
So far the government’s attacks have been beaten back by the combativity of workers and rank and file soldiers. The weapons armistice has been treated with derision. Threats of up to eight years’ imprisonment and fines of up to one million Escudos for possession of weapons yielded only two out of the estimated 10,000 missing from armouries. The power of the neighbourhood and workers’ commissions and the rank and file soldiers’ organisation, SUV (Soldiers United Will Win), has been extended. Seizures by armed farm workers of the large southern farms have continued.
The government’s first attack, and defeat, came at the end of September when they imprisoned two soldiers for distributing leaflets of the newly formed SUV. A demonstration the next day was a massive show of support for SUV. 12,000 soldiers and 80,000 workers marched through Lisbon and commandeered buses to take them 15 miles to the prison where they successfully freed the two men.
The fight for Radio Renascença
Two weeks later, the government ordered troops to occupy the radio stations. This was a pretext to close down Radio Renascença, once the official Catholic Church radio, where a struggle for workers’ control had been going on for over a year. The government moves were also an attempt to impose control of the news by the MFA information agency. Within hours of the close-down, large crowds were protesting outside the Information Ministry. Ignoring attempts by Cavalho to head the movement off and leave the situation in the hands of COPCON, the assembled crowds went to the stations where discussion with the occupying troops led to them going over to the workers.
The government retaliated by ordering loyal commanders to occupy the transmitters, thus silencing Radio Renascença. The studios, however, remained occupied by workers and left COPCON units. Fearing intervention by the paratroops, all stations were guarded by armed troops and civilians during the nights of Monday 29th and Tuesday 30th of September. The Republica officers were also guarded. The government had succeeded in stopping Radio Renascença’s broadcasts, but the mood in the ranks of the army had been clearly demonstrated. During the next weeks a campaign for for the reopening of Radio Renascença developed, with the worker-controlled newspaper Republica playing an important role in publicising the issue. The studios remained occupied by workers and the transmitters by commandos. The neighbourhood commissions at Buraca mounted a permanent picket at the transmitter gates and the commandos were eventually withdrawn a few days before a 40,000-strong demonstration reopened the station. Hostility from the local population is claimed to have played an important role in the commandos’ withdrawal.
After three weeks off the air, Radio Renascença was reopened by the demonstration which was supported by 15 soldiers’ commissions and 50 workers’ commissions from the Lisbon area. Unable to cope with mass mobilisations and the disloyalty of soldiers, the government eventually used crack troops to blow up the transmitter, silencing Radio Renascença on Friday 7 November.
The metal workers’ fight
Another important defeat for the government was at the hands of the Metal Workers Union. A struggle over pay and conditions led to the Fifth Provisional Government agreeing to the workers’ demands. However, many employers refused to concede and the Sixth Government’s reversal of the earlier agreement led to a one-day national strike of 200,000 metal workers on Tuesday 7 October. The strike was also against the Sixth Government’s introduction of laws allowing for lockouts and dismissal of strikers. Tens of thousands of metal workers demonstrated in the main cities that evening. In Lisbon this culminated outside the Ministry of Labour, with a massive rally eventually dispersing when the government conceded most of the demands and waived the lockout rules for the metal workers, although they still remain for the rest of the working class.
The crackdown in the army
The Sixth Government has appointed right-wing commanders in all three military regions and attempted to purge revolutionary soldiers and officers. These moves have been resisted. This struggle reached a peak in the Northern Military Region when the regional commander, Pires Veloso, tried to close a left-wing unit of lorry drivers (CICAP). This small unit of 150 men received support from the left-wing artillery regiment, RASP. CICAP’s isolation was overcome by RASP occupying its own barracks and opening them to CICAP and sympathetic soldiers from other units. The red flag was raised—the struggle began.
Left-wing troops demanded immediate reinstatement of CICAP, a guarantee of no victimisation of any soldier involved in the struggle, and the dismissal of Veloso. Local workers’ commissions and the metal workers supported the struggle. When a demonstration was called by the PPD (a right-wing, anti-working class party whose members claim to be Social Democrats) to support Veloso, a large crowd of workers gathered outside the barracks to demonstrate their support for the soldiers inside.
The PPD demonstration marched on the barracks armed with pistols, hunting rifles and some automatic weapons and clashed with the defenders. Unarmed soldiers from the barracks tried to separate the two sides, but were attacked by the PPD. The RASP soldiers then brought out two tanks to disperse the right wing. There were 56 casualties during the night, and this led to a permanent vigil being kept by the workers, armed with clubs. Streets leading to the barracks were blocked and uprooted cobblestones stockpiled for any further right-wing protests.
Intervention by the army chief of staff, General Fabiao, led to the concession of the first two demands. CICAP was to be reinstated in new barracks and a guarantee of no disciplinary measures was given. However, the army leadership obviously intends to ignore this agreement since disciplinary measures have begun. Furthermore, a proposed meeting on 24 October to assess the situation and continue the struggle for Veloso’s removal was stopped by right-wing officers.
Faced with the militant response of the working class and rank and file soldiers to the attacks of the state, the government finally managed to mobilise a demonstration in Oporto on 25 October to support its policies. The Prime Minister, Admiral Azevedo, flew in to speak to this massive demonstration organised by the Socialist Party and supported by the PPD and CDS (the latter is a right-wing group which provides a haven for fascists). These organisations mobilised all over the North of the country for the event which was portrayed by the government-controlled television as a great victory. Young girls presented Azevedo with flowers and martial music was broadcast as an accompaniment to pictures of the demonstration. The right-wing newspaper Journal de Noticias, was able to say the next day, ‘at last there is an alternative to the Left’.
The Portuguese Communist Party (PCP)
Weakened by the fall of Goncalves and the Socialist Party mobilisation against it in the North, the PCP was prepared to compromise by taking part in the government with the PPD. Having opted out of the United Front with the revolutionary left, the PCP moved to the right to maintain its position. By its participation in the Sixth Government, it is implicated in all the anti-working class moves which that government has made. It has either abstained or given only half-hearted support to the struggles against the government.
At the same time, it has been forced to be verbally militant and attempts to play a dual role. While participating in the government, it uses mass mobilisations as a stage army to bolster up its attempts to carve out a better position in the state apparatus. The PCP uses its control over the workers’ and neighbourhood commissions in the Lisbon area to launch demonstrations backing its governmental manoeuvres. For instance, when the Sixth Government was being formed, a demonstration was called with good general antifascist and anti-CIA slogans; but the main slogan, ‘For a Government to defend the gains of the Revolution’, implied that more PCP representation in the Sixth Government could do that. The PCP has attempted to channel the mass movement against the Sixth Government into support for a return to the laws of the Fifth.
They have built a cult around Vasco Gonçalves which causes further confusion. Their supporters carry pictures of him on demonstrations and copies of his ‘sayings’ are on sale.
With the revolutionary left raising no clear workers’ demands on the government which could act as an alternative, the danger is that the mass movement against the government may well be led back under the safe wing of the PCP.
However, the PCP by no means has guaranteed control of future movements. There are splits and regional differences within it. When it left the United Front and joined the government, groups of worker-members defected to the left in several areas. In some areas there are semi-organised rank and file oppositions. These do not represent a real break but are an expression of left moves amongst the working class and dissatisfaction with PCP participation in a right-wing government. Because of a lack of political development, these movements are easily headed off by the verbal militancy of the Party leadership.
A major difference exists in the PCP in the southern farming areas of Alentejo, where there is widespread seizures of large farms by armed workers, ejection of landlords and the formation of collective farms. After initially criticising the occupations, the PCP has been forced to support them because of the revolutionary fervour of the population and because its own members in the region were leading the struggles. The Reform Agraria movement, which is an attempt to coordinate and centralise the running of the cooperatives, is enthusiastically supported by the PCP and it has great influence within it.
The majority of the leadership of the rank and file of the Party remains to the left of European Stalinism. The only split in the leadership is right-opposition group, which favours a coalition with the Socialist Party. This group is heavily influenced by the Spanish and Italian CPs.
The Portuguese Socialist Party (PSP)
Occupying the majority position in the Sixth Government, the PSP has been responsible for all the anti-working class legislation. It is difficult to assess what remains of the working class support it had at the time of the election, for its electoral strength is not reflected in organisational form.
Its mobilisations in Lisbon against the radio station occupations by workers and soldiers are almost totally white collar and petty bourgeois in composition. However, the illusion it has peddled of economic prosperity going hand in hand with stable social democratic government (using the examples of West Germany and Sweden) has struck a chord. It obviously has support amongst backward sections of the working class, especially in the North.
Its joint slates with a Maoist group, the MRPP, succeeded in winning union elections and withdrawing several of these unions from the CP-dominated Intersyndical. However, there are signs of splits by organised Socialist Party workers as the right-wing nature of the government becomes more and more obvious. For instance, when Soares denounced the metal workers’ strike at a Socialist Party rally in Oporto, the metal workers’ contingent left in protest.
The revolutionary left
The development of the Revolutionary United Front (FUR), which is composed of six non-Maoist groups to the left of the CP, has had an important impact. The front began when the CP used the revolutionary left to defend its position as the Gonçalves regime collapsed and the Socialist Party launched its attacks in the North. When the CP left the Front and joined the government, FUR was launched and made some gains amongst CP workers.
Since then, FUR has made important initiatives. During the struggle around the radio stations, it provided the lead together with the Maoist UDP. Similarly, the FUR and UDP has influenced the development of SUV.
However, FUR’s lack of programmatic clarity and the diverse politics of the groups within it mean that this progress will be difficult to maintain as the tasks facing revolutionaries become sharper with the escalation of the crisis. Held together by the healthy but insufficient sentiment that ‘it is better to work together than apart’, the groups within it constantly split on the very questions that such a front should answer in a united voice.
The situation in the army
The government strategy has been to attempt to isolate and purge left-wingers and to dissolve units controlled totally by the left. There are continued attempts to dissolve COPCON and the Military Police—one of the most revolutionary units in the Lisbon area, the South and in Oporto. The government’s attempt to set up AMI has met with much resistance; many units have refused to serve in it. The government has now reissued automatic weapons to the Republican Guard, instructing them to take over the functions of COPCON.
The government cannot rely on any section of the army exposed to discussion with the civilian population. This is why it had to blow up Radio Renascença’s transmitter, since the occupying troops’ loyalty might have changed. Inducements of 5,500 Escudos a month as opposed to the conscript monthly wage of 250 Escudos were used in the attempt to strengthen AMI. This has resulted in the re-enlistment of many right-wing ex-commandos and paratroopers. The government is also attempting to transform the armed forces from conscript recruits to a regular service and aims to disband the units most radicalised by the experience of the summer.
The organisation and spreading of the rank and file revolt in the army has been greatly assisted by the development of SUV. Beginning in Oporto, there have been big mobilisations in every major town. Despite SUV’s strength, fears of victimisation cause soldiers to wear masks to avoid recognition on demonstrations. There are dangers of the movement being headed off since the less right-wing moderates like Fabiao and Carvalho are suggesting that SUV be legalised and incorporated into the MFA. To avoid this and to continue its development, the programme of SUV must be extended. To consolidate and translate its support into a stable organisational form, the fight must begin for the election and recall of all officers by mass meetings of rank and file soldiers. Without this, the fear of victimisation will continue and existing high levels of consciousness may diminish.
The CP played no role in setting up SUV and initially opposed it; but it is now forced to support it. A CP takeover must be resisted although such a move is unlikely. The setting up of SUV caused important developments in the Navy. A rank and file movement (CDAP) already existed. Its CP leadership refused to support SUV but a rank and file revolt led to the reversal of that decision.
The development of SUV has been the most important development in the armed forces over the last two months. Before, revolutionaries argued for the need to exacerbate the splits in the MFA, but this has been speedily bypassed. The Revolutionary Council is now firmly in the hands of the right wing and the arena of struggle is between the rank and file and the hierarchy.
The Sixth Government has failed to destroy the gains made by workers and soldiers since the coup. Workers in towns and countryside have continued to build their own organisations.
However, the government has far from given up. It has recently prepared an economic programme as part of its efforts to obtain aid from international organisations like the EEC. Wide ranging economic cuts including rationing of basic foodstuffs and wage restraints are included. It proposes the freezing of industrial wage negotiations until the end of the year. However, the document also recognises that its application is likely to provoke ‘serious political problems … Consequently its formal announcement is likely to be delayed until the Revolutionary Council of the Armed Forces Movement has completed the task of restoring military discipline’. (Financial Times, 12.11.75).
The Lisbon building workers’ strike for 40% increases and the siege of the prime minister and government show that the workers have not been beaten back. Their victory clearly demonstrates to the government just how serious these political problems will be.
But the bourgeoisie will not politely leave the stage. They will try every trick in the book to keep their property and power. If they are allowed, they will find a government with the political colouration to aid them in this task. As a senior economist at the Bank of Portugal said, ‘Force will have to be used and the standard of living pushed down. The important thing is that the government must have the political complexion to drive this through’.
The bosses are already training troops in Spain and constantly developing new strategies. Backed by Wilson and the Common Market, they will resort to all forms of sabotage and provocation to reassert their power. They have the support and advice of the entire machinery of American and European capitalism. They will stop at nothing.
Portugal must not become another Chile. The danger of this is clearly realised by many workers. Hence the aggressive slogan ‘Portugal will not be the Chile of Europe’ is shouted by workers on many demonstrations. The gains of the workers and soldiers must not be drowned in blood. Only the development of workers’ power can prevent this. Either the Portuguese workers go forward to the seizure of power of the entire international workers’ movement will suffer a mighty setback.
The decisive moment
The summer offensive of the ‘forces of order’, spearheaded by Mario Soares’s Socialist Party, and the ‘moderate’ grouping the AFM around Fabiao and Antunes, resulted in the installation of the Sixth Provisional Government headed by Admiral Pinheiro de Azevedo. This government has two central tasks; to restore the armed forces as disciplined tools of the state power and to wrest from the workers the gains they have made in terms of wages and conditions. In addition, it must arrest the encroachment on management autocracy by the various forms of workers’ control.
So far, the government has failed to achieve its first aim, which weakens it considerably when it comes to the task of disciplining workers. The government’s chief hopes of achieving its goals are to organise or rely on:
However, no serious shift of class forces in the bourgeoise’s favour has yet occurred. The workers’ and soldiers’ movements are gathering momentum. The next few months, even weeks, could be decisive. In this period, the strategy and tactics of the revolutionary workers are crucial to the fate of the revolution.
The question is now posed—will the workers in the factories and the fields, and the soldiers in the barracks, find the road to insurrection, then establish the dictatorship of the proletariat; or will the bourgeoisie and the army high-ups establish a crushing Bonapartist dictatorship (perhaps decorated to a greater or lesser degree as a ‘pluralist democracy’)?
Crucial problem areas for the fate of the Portuguese revolution are:
The united front
The hold reformist parties still have within the working class, their power to confuse and obstruct the mobilistion of the class for the crucial offensive and even for defence of previous gains, necessitates the fight by revolutionaries for a workers’ united front against reaction.
The present FUR is totally inadequate for this purpose. It does not include the CP, the largest and most influential party in the working class. Its manifesto is an ideological muddle—too long winded and imprecise for the agreed slogans of a united front and too compromised for the programme of a revolutionary party. A united front requires limited but precise fighting slogans that attempt to win all workers’ and soldiers’ organisations to them while allowing the clearest delineation of political tendencies within that front.
What immediate issues must be taken up by a united workers’ movement? What issues point the way to the only solution—workers’ power? Revolutionaries should fight for a united front which takes up the following point.
Workers’ councils
The Portuguese working class has shown immense creativity in the variety of fighting organisations it has built. For instance, workers’ and neighbourhood committees of struggle. This has done despite constant attempts by the whole spectrum of Stalinism from the PCP to the MDP to bureaucratise them or subject them to their sectarian stranglehold.
The urgent task is to draw delegates from these bodies into local councils and, ultimately, a national assembly. Important elements of dual power are emerging. The task is to speed and strengthen this development and open the road to workers’ power. Dual power is a highly unstable situation which must be resolved one way or the other. To develop workers’ councils, all sectarianism must be laid aside—all bona fide delegates from workplaces must be admitted, whatever workers’ party they belong to. Any attempts to limit their membership to ‘revolutionary’ workers or to exclude certain parties or to proclaim the councils anti-party will prove disastrous.
The broadest masses of workers, rural and urban, and the widest layers of soldiers and sailors must be drawn into these bodies. They can form a massive bulwark against reaction immediately. With the correct leadership, they would be the most powerful lever for achieving workers’ power. To enable workers in these councils to assess the right lead—the most correct strategy—there must be absolute freedom of expression and caucus for all workers’ parties.
The revolutionary party
The multiplicity of revolutionary groups has helped produce a certain anti-party sentiment amongst the most militant sectors of the Portuguese working class. The representatives of ‘official’ Trotskyism, the LCI and PRT, stand largely on the sidelines.
The Maoists stand immobilised by their Stalinism; the Third Period ‘Social Fascist’ line added to the stages theory which rules out the proletarian dictatorship leads to a combination of hysterical ultra-left phrase-mongering (and obstruction of the united front) with a Menshevik shrinking from the perspective of workers’ power.
Left-centrist groupings such as the MES and PRP are healthier in the short run—both have assisted, propagandised and initiated the formation of workers’ and soldiers’ rank and file organisations.
But the Portuguese revolution is moving into a stage where the question of the party resolves itself into the question of what programme or which strategy leads to victory.
The PRP has many correct elements of such a strategy. It has broken with the Stalinist stages theory and in practice and theory recognised the international nature of the Portuguese revolution. At the same time, it has rejected the seductive ‘left’ nonsense of ‘Social Fascism’.
But what are its weaknesses? Some are associated with its strengths—a certain militarism led to sowing illusions in Carvalho and the left officers. Another important weakness is PRP’s lack of clarity about the united front and the relationship this should have with the CP.
The PRP tends to see things in the light of logistics rather than politics. For this reason, it seriously underestimates the question of a programme. Its slogans hover between maximalism—‘The Dictatorship of the Proletariat’—and the immediate demands of the day. Its programme, such as it is, lacks any clear understanding of transitional politics. Its tactics are confused and eclectic, particularly on the united front. To suggest, as the International Socialists do, that all this would be solved by a daily paper and mass recruiting, is lunacy. The PRP must develop quickly a revolutionary programme or become a serious centrist obstacle to the revolution (joining the Maoists and the MES). In outline, such a development would mean:
Revolutionaries should take up within the untied front and the workers’ councils:
The international situation
The revolution, itself owing an enormous debt to the heroic national liberation struggles against the Portuguese colonial occupation forces, exerts an enromous influence on developments in Europe and beyond.
The Spanish revolution will bring enormous assistance to the Portuguese workers. But to suggest a policy of waiting for Spain is disastrous. The seizure of power by the Portuguese workers would be the biggest stimulus to the Spanish working class and all oppressed nationalities. A Workers’ State in Portugal could lend a Spanish uprising material support. For revolutionaries in the rest of Europe, Portugal is a vital issue. Maximum assistance must be given to the Portuguese workers and soldiers and solidarity action stepped up. Direct links must be built between workers’ organisations. The correct analysis of the Portuguese revolution is a touchstone of revolutionary strategy and could act as the focus for the reconstruction of the International and its programme.
