The balance of class forces has swung sharply to the right in the aftermath of the abortive rebellion of the Lisbon paratroopers. The sixth provisional government has been saved for the moment, to the rejoicing of the capitalist class all around Europe and America.
The Azevedo government, installed in late August to ‘restore order’ in the barracks and factories, has staggered from crisis to crisis ever since. Its problems came to a head with the siege of the Constituant Assembly by striking building workers in mid-November. During the siege it was unable to rely on troops to protect it: in Lisbon only the Commandos and the military school cavalry remained loyal to it. This incident led to a showdown which at one point took Portugal to the brink of civil war. The Socialist Party and the PPD ministers suspended the working of the cabinet and demanded the removal of radical officers like Othelo de Carvhalo and General Fabaio (hoping to guarantee themselves protection from further demonstrations of workers in Lisbon).
They also threatened to move the government to the North where it would have acted as a rallying point for the right.
Faced with this situation President Costa Gomes vacillated trying to patch up yet another compromise. Carvahlo was removed as commander of the Lisbon military region but kept his post as head of the radicalised COPCON units. At the same time some of the overtly revolutionary moves of the government were revoked. For example, the elite AMI units were formally disbanded, although in reality they had already lost credibility. Neither side was satisfied by this. Socialist Party leader Soares threatened mobilisation of the conservative Northern peasantry. Demonstration of right wing farmers took place in some Northern towns; they threatened to block road and rail links to Lisbon. The right wing Northern military command promised to send reliable troops to the assistance of the government.
These events show the inevitable confrontation that was developing between the forces of the left and the so-called ‘moderates’ behind whom stand more sinister right wing elements. There is little doubt that a right wing offensive against the radical units and the left controlled media was being planned behind the scenes. Several days before the revolt of the paras, Republica reported that the Revolutionary Council of the Armed Forces had drawn up a plan to switch radio and TV broadcasts from the Lisbon to the Oporto networks. In fact the Council had set up a unit to prepare such a plan and to clear the ground for the demobilisation of troublesome units. It was headed by Col. Eanes and included Col. Jaime Neves, later to be hailed as the hero by the right for his role in suppressing the paras revolt.
Amongst the most radical soldiers in Lisbon the response was confused and unco-ordinated. It was in this situation that the paratroopers took steps on Tuesday November 25. They seized the HQ of the Air Force command and occupied the airbases at Monsanto, Montiuo, Tancos and Monte Real. Until recently the paratroopers were regarded as being loyal to the 6th government. They supplied recruits to the AMIs. This was reversed when they were hoodwinked into guarding Radio Renescenca whilst government agents blew up the transmitter; incensed by this the paratroopers returned to barracks and resolved that they would never again obey orders unless they were agreed to by a mass meeting.
To atone for their past they also decided to mount an armed guard around the offices of the worker controlled newspaper, Republica, to protect it from right wing attacks. Faced with the loss of yet another regiment the AFM Council set out to disband them. The paras were given compulsory home leave and threatened with the cutting off of pay and food rations. Facing these provocations they decided to defend themselves and stay in Lisbon to continue their new political role.
The paratroopers are generally regarded as being politically unsophisticated. But since the incident at Radio Renescaeca they have developed a strong loyalty to the left and a week before their revolt promised Carvalho ‘123,000 rounds a minute’ of backing. But their rebellion was ill-timed and premature — its purpose unclear. It was not a coup in the real sense but simply an attempt to secure their position and retain Carvahlo.
Faced with an albeit premature rebellion the other left groups units mounted a desperate attempt at support. RALIS occupied positions on the motorway leading to the north, the airport and the Beirrolas arsenal. EPAM units occupied the TV studios and began to broadcast an appeal to workers but were cut off in mid-sentence as the government plan to switch transmissions to Oporto went into action. In the industrial areas crowds of workers assembled demanding arms and asking for directions. The role of the supposedly left officers was atrocious. For example at Ralis, the officer allowed government commando units through the lines and then abandoned the regiment. At Armarda Forte the ‘left’ officer refused to give arms to workers who wanted to defend the paratroopers.
The commandos therefore had little difficulty in quelling the rebellion. Within 24 hours the paratroopers had surrendered without a fight. The only real fighting took place at the barracks of the Military Police barracks. 200 commandos stormed the building which was defended by military policemen and some civilian revolutionaries.
The Communist Party’s role remains obscure. When the 6th government took office the CP accepted a minor ministerial position. At first it ignored the mass mobilisations around Radio Renescenca and SUV but later took them over and diverted them into a campaign to exclude the PPD from the cabinet and replace them by communists. Thus the CP combined a collaborationist policy with militant rhetoric.
During this period a division developed between those CP members who wanted to pursue a policy similar to the Italians’ ‘historic compromise’ and those who wanted a more aggressive line not unlike that followed by the East European parties after the Second World War. Despite differences of emphasis both approaches lead to bureaucratic manoeuvring which defuse the mass movement, heads it away from the goal of workers power and leaves the working class unprepared for civil war. The split however may be at the root of the CP’s ambiguous role in the rebellion. Some of those who appear to have supported it are CP allies, eg, Major Jose Costa Martinas. At first the party gave the revolt unofficial support but later withdrew, condemning it as an ‘adventurist’ move and refusing to mobilise its supporters in the industrial areas. The CP must take the major blame for the failure to mobilise support. Having given tacit support they then backed down leaving the left-wing soldiers to their fate. Had they co-ordinated resistance, mobilised their support on the streets and called a general strike the government and the military right could have been held to a stalemate.
The revolutionary left appears to have played only a slightly better role. We have pointed out before (see Workers Power, November 19, 1975) the weaknesses of FUR, MES and the PRP, in particular their failure to fight for a principled workers united front. This failure allowed the CP to head off the movement with only limited gains by the left. The PRP has also added the folly of calling for an insurrection when conditions made this premature. Although there is no evidence that they played a direct role in the revolt their general propaganda may have contributed to it. What is scandalous is that, given the PRP’s perspective of an insurrection, when the revolt erupted they were totally unprepared. When groups of CP workers, angry with their own leaders, came to the PRP offices looking for a lead the PRP could give none. This failure directly reflects the PRP’s failure to develop a united front programme and the illusions which it had in the left officers. By concentrating on the army they had failed to develop an essential working class base.
The failure of the revolt gave the 6th government all the cover it needed to restore ‘order’. It immediately declared a state of emergency; all radio, TV and newspapers were banned, except for the government controlled station; the rights of assembly and free speech were suspended and a curfew imposed. In the following days the government too took powers of summary arrest, house searches and censorship of mail. Since then a purge of left-wingers from the media, state and army had begun. The COPCON units have been disbanded and left officers removed from their posts. Over 750 people have passed through detention; about 200 are still under arrest and being held in the north. The left in the army has been virtually atomised.
The brunt of civilian repression is against the revolutionary left. The PRP has been forced underground again as loyal troops search out missing caches of arms. The government strategy is to isolate revolutionaries from the CP and its supporters, and this is being done by holding out the bait of more CP places in government in return for declarations of non-involvement in the revolt and non-opposition to the repressive measures. The CP has faithfully responded and is currently calling for calm. But the right wing parties cannot resist calling for the complete purging of the CP. If the 6th government is successful in the consolidation of its control then the CP will be next for the chopping block.
This concern to pull the CP back into the fold also importantly reflects the concern of officers of the ‘moderate’ group, such as Antunes, that they had to rely on allies of the extreme right to defeat the left. They know that men like Neves, a man responsible for one of the most notorious massacres in Mozambique, are not yet satisfied.
The setbacks of the last two weeks are, however, not the end of the matter. The government has been successful in its first aim: the strengthening of its control over the army. It will now turn its attention to dismantling the working class gains made since the April coup.
Socialists should be clear that these setbacks do not represent the return of fascism to Portugal — although they could pave the way. The regime in Portugal has always been a Bonapartist one; at first a left moving one but now firmly right-wing. The development of revolutionary organisation in the army has always rested upon the existence of a militant working class movement. The course of the Portuguese revolution now crucially depends upon the actions of the industrial workers — and this depends upon the role which parties like the PRP and MES play. If they quickly learn the lessons of their past mistakes then the reactionary forces could be fought back. Workers Power has to repeat that the first essential is a vigorous agitation for a principled workers united front which can define the essential class organisations, co-ordinate the struggle against economic boycott, rebuild links with rank and file soldiers and prepare the way for proletarian state power.
But, for revolutionaries in the rest of Europe the main task must remain the construction of an effective solidarity campaign rooted in the organisations of the working class.
What can we do in Britain?
- Fight for affiliations to the Campaign of Solidarity with the Portuguese working class from trade union branches, shop stewards committees, trades councils, Labour Party branches, etc.
- Form a local organising committee of the Campaign to co-ordinate work in the localities. Speakers and the film Viva Portugal are available from the PWCC, 12 Little Newport St, London WC2.
- Sell the English language edition of Republica, available from PWCC.
- Build rank and file links between workers in Britain and in Portugal to fight the boycotting of the Portuguese economy by British firms.
