Although the death of Mao Tse-tung came as a surprise to no one, most commentators were caught very flat-footed by the speed at which events developed once he was gone. There is little doubt that this surprise was shared by the vast majority of the Chinese people themselves.
What lies behind the decision of the new regime to move so fast against its opponents, the so-called ‘Shanghai clique’? At first sight it would seem fairly straightforward. For years Hua, and the strata he represents, have been in de facto control of the machinery of state, the army, the greater part of the Communist Party and could confidently rely on the support of the managerial strata in industry. At the same time the ‘Shanghai Four’ had lost much of the support they enjoyed among the masses during the ‘Cultural Revolution’ by the central role they played in the suppression of the popular anti-bureaucratic movements at the end of that period. On the face of it then Hua and company were merely asserting their dominance to remove an irritant that no longer enjoyed the patronage of Mao himself.
However, such an explanation overlooks several important dimensions to the problem. Firstly, if the ‘Four’ were so unpopular, so impotent, why the need to act so fast? Why the quite incredible charges made against them? Why the rumours of political trial so reminiscent of the Moscow purges? Are the ‘Four’ being smashed so completely in order to “encourage others”? Is the move a precursor of some change of policy so enormous that any potential critics — even discredited or unpopular ones — have to be silenced first?
It is all too easy, given the scantiness of information from China, to fall into the trap of personalism. The nature of the present struggle in China also encourages this. The factional strife in China takes place only within the confines of the higher echelons of the bureaucracy. Since 1949 this bureaucracy has attempted, by a variety of means, to develop China in its own interests as opposed to those of the workers and peasants. The present power struggle represents only a division within the bureaucracy as to the best strategy to create and maintain a stable state capitalist regime under the control of the bureaucracy. The bureaucrats function as a ruling class, albeit a divided one at present. This point is essential to an understanding both of the present in-fighting and the political development of China in general.
The two factions
Despite the apparent confidence of the new regime they are (and must know it) playing a dangerous game. It is generally known that behind Hua Kuo-feng stand many of the celebrated ‘capitalist roaders’ of yesteryear — Teng Hsiao-ping, Li Hsien-nien for example. For Hua to come to power and immediately accuse Chiang-ching of precisely the crimes of which Mao accused his own backers, is to risk the credibility of the new regime in the eyes of the workers and peasants. A quarter of the entire population of the world is not as ‘poor and blank’ as Mao would have had us believe, neither are they the quiescent beasts of burden that Mao’s Western admirers would like to think.
The struggle between the ‘Maoists’ and the ‘capitalist roaders’ has been going on for years. To understand what is going on at present we have first to look at what the two sides stand for and how they got their images of ‘radical’ and ‘moderate’.
As was true of Mao both wings are explicitly nationalist in their politics. Both wish to see China build herself into a modern, industrialised country. Both believe in ‘Socialism in One Country’. In other words the arguments in China today bear no resemblance to those in Russia in the twenties. The Maoist faction do not represent some kind of unconscious proponents of ‘permanent revolution’ as is argued by S.S. Wu in Inprecor Nos. 59 and 60.
The ‘capitalist roaders’ (moderates to the western press) want to industrialise relatively quickly. Their aim is to build a technologically advanced industrial sector. Their policy, on the face of it practical but actually utopian, is to import technological know-how and plant. In the future they hope to re-produce this technology and expertise domestically and then return to some kind of autarchy. Such a policy is doomed on several counts: the initial cost, in foreign currency, of the imports, the subsequent cost of interest-laden repayments, the social implications of capital-rather than labour-intensive techniques, the difficulty, if not impossibility, of integrating such plant into a generally backward economy incapable of producing the sophisticated back-up requirements, the time, cost and social implications of training an elite strata of experts to use the new plant. This is the policy which, in recent years has led to the importation of sophisticated iron-smelting plant, joint plans for mineral exploitation with the Japanese, the importation of computerised mining equipment.
In order to finance this programme they have depended on two main factors: the export of oil-based products from the Taching oilfields, and the export of agricultural produce. It is their programme that fits most easily into the designs of world imperialism particularly the US, who look to the massive Chinese market and the untapped mineral resources as an element in a possible way out of their current difficulties. If the ‘capitalist roaders’ have their way we can expect an increase in Chinese involvement on the world market and, probably, the development of the import of foreign capital.
By contrast the ‘radicals’ remain fixed to the policy of Mao. This consists, essentially, in trying to develop all sections of the economy at the same time. The speed at which this can be done depends almost solely on the rate of accumulation of capital and, therefore, on the rate of exploitation of the peasantry and workers. In classic Maoist fashion the radicals see the key to rapid development in the enthusiasm of the masses. Hence the political method of Maoism, close involvement of the party at lower levels and ‘political’ campaigns to keep enthusiasm (and, therefore, output) high. It is this method that has given Maoism its radical image.
Common to both wings is a foreign policy based on the supposed interests of the Chinese state. For the moderates this helps to obtain the foreign markets and the capital equipment. For the radicals it both diverts domestic attention away from the realities of hardship and is designed to set one imperialist power (the US) against what they see as a more threatening one (the Soviet Union).
Both policies are fraught with difficulties which increase with time. The ‘radical’ approach quite obviously implies a low standard of living for the masses. There has, for example, been no national revision of the wage scale (an eight-point range of differentials) since 1956! Both during and after the ‘cultural revolution’ workers have struck not only for wage rises but for payment of arrears, in some cases stretching back over a year. Particularly over the last two years there has been an increase in wage strikes throughout China, led by the railway and petro-chemical workers.
Although much has been made by the ‘radicals’ of the ‘capitalist roaders’ plans to stimulate production through an increase in wage incentives (this is called economism in the Maoist press) the fact that they are now in power is unlikely to lead to any general raising of income levels. In order to placate particular groups of workers, to soften up the impact of the introduction of capital-intensive technology and, generally, to consolidate their power, the Hua regime may allow wage increases in some sectors. They are in no position, given the need to accumulate capital, to concede a general rise.
With regard to the countryside, it is first necessary to dispose of the popularly held myths. The only way in which China was dragged back from famine in the early sixties was by massive ‘liberalisation’ in the countryside. In particular of the policy concerning the cultivation of private plots by the peasantry. As a necessary development of this there has grown up a substantial black market version of the free market. Alongside this has gone a developing differentiation within the class. Both wings of the bureaucracy are powerless to do anything about this. It is notable that the peasantry, who supplied most of the support for the Communist Party and the PLA in the days of the Civil War were kept totally outside the parameters of the ‘cultural revolution’. The slightest upset in the countryside, the reduction of production by a few per cent could cause domestic chaos. On top of this, as noted above, agriculture is an import foreign currency earner. We can, therefore, expect a continuation of the ‘pragmatic’ policy towards the peasantry and, hence, the continued differentiation of that class.
The western press have made much of the possibility of rapprochement between the People’s Republic of China and the Soviet Union as a result of Hua’s gaining power. On the face of it this would seem very plausible. Past representatives of this strata have regularly been accused of pro-Sovietism by their opponents — Liu, Teng, Lin Piao etc. An argument could perhaps be made out that by “normalising” relations with Russia the kind of modern technological and (importantly) military aid could be obtained without going onto what is normally thought of as the world market. However, this is actually most unlikely, not because of ideological differences (these obviously matter not one jot to a regime that can maintain friendly relations with Chile) but rather because of the inability of the Soviet economy to deliver the kind of assistance on the kind of scale China’s leaders are probably thinking of. No, more probably some kind of diminution of mutual hostility is required for two perfectly pragmatic reasons. Firstly, to remove the ever-present threat of military engagement along the disputed frontiers with the Soviet Union. Secondly, to encourage the western powers to give more generous credit terms to China when she goes shopping.
One of the other bargaining counters in this real-politik may well be the future status of Taiwan, and somewhat less likely, the Korean situation.
The radicals
The radicals, on the other hand, stand for a continued belligerent approach towards the Soviet Union and a cooling of relations with the United States. Again this does not stem from any principled political position. On the contrary it is an aspect of their “pull the country up by its bootstraps” theory. An integral part of persuading the workers to work harder is to present a picture of China surrounded by antagonistic powers. Such a siege mentality is essential for them if they are to present themselves as the leaders of a nation in peril in which “sectional” interests (i.e. class interests of workers and peasants) have to be subordinated to the interests of the continued existence of the state. It also prepares public opinion for the characterisation of opponents as subversive of the state and agents of imperialism.
The policy differences between the two factions then, are real enough. Can they explain though the events of the last period? Certainly, the bureaucratic methods of both dispose them to behind-the-scenes manoeuvring rather then open political struggle involving the workers and peasants. This is, however, a secondary factor. The main reason, indeed one of the few things that both factions are surely agreed upon, is their fear of the effect on the workers and peasants of such an open debate. Why should this be so?
The answer lies in the experience and political development of the masses during and since the ‘Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution’.
The Cultural Revolution was itself the result of the struggle between factions of the bureaucracy. Unable to force his position through the party, Mao took the risk of mobilising first the students and then the industrial workers themselves. However, once the lid was taken off the Chinese political cauldron the resultant release of pressure was so great that Mao had to retreat in disorder, relying on the army to suppress rapidly developing autonomous movements in the cities. Space does not permit us to go into any great detail of this tumultuous period — the strikes, occupations, munition raids and finally open armed confrontation with the People’s Liberation Army — 36,000 soldiers against the radicals of Shengyang — the dropping of paratroopers and the use of artillery to regain central control of Wuhan. Some of the political implications however, can be summed up.
Social connections between the military leadership and the state bureaucracy
Firstly, the chaos in which the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution ended is a factor in explaining the allegiance to Hua of both the People’s Liberation Army and the technocrats. Stability could not have been restored without the intervention of the army whose importance was thereby underlined. The interests of the leadership of the military centre on concern that such disorder should not return and the development of sophisticated weaponry. Coupled with this are the important social connections between the military leadership and the state bureaucracy, both of which developed out of the militarised Chinese Communist Party during and after the liberation. The technocrats also expect the new regime to benefit them in terms of their role within the production of the more sophisticated technology.
On the other hand the Red Guards — the original advance guard of the Cultural Revolution — were totally disillusioned by Mao’s retreat and use of overwhelming force against them. At the same time the massive strike wave and the nationwide links developed by workers in struggle regained for the Chinese proletariat some of the experience lost in the catastrophic defeat of the twenties. The armed clashes with the People’s Liberation Army and the cynical manipulative methods of the bureaucracy also taught invaluable lessons that cannot possibly have been eradicated in the subsequent years. Whilst reports of 40,000 killed in the suppression of the “ultra-left” of the Province of Kwangtung are more than likely wild exaggerations — the killing of even one thousandth of that number by troops of a supposed ‘People’s Army’ cannot but have a long lasting effect on the consciousness of the working class.
The echoes of the shots of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution still reverberate around China. Hangchow is even now under at least partial military control since the suppression of the general strike there two years ago.
Other social problems stem from the suppression of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. For example the ex-Red Guard students who “went down to the countryside to learn from the peasantry” (euphemism for internal exile) for the most part chose not to stay there. Resentful at their enforced expulsion from the cities, resented by the peasantry from whom they were supposed to learn, hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions, became even more alienated from the regime and returned, illegally, to the cities. Unable to get residence permits and, therefore, rations, they live off the meagre resources of their families turning increasingly to crime for income. In Sian, for example in July this year, twenty four youngsters were jailed for raiding banks. But these are not mere lumpen elements, most of the strikes that have taken place in recent years have been explained by the ruling regime as the result of the agitation of such “criminal” elements. Refugee Red Guards speak of the dissemination, particularly in Canton, of political literature aimed at both wings of the bureaucracy. In the aftermath of the Tien An Men riots the slogan, “Down With Chin Shih-huang” (Chin Shih-huang was the first emperor to unify China) was seen in cities throughout China. This could have only been aimed at Mao himself and represents an important break with the period of the Cultural Revolution when even the most left wing groups still adhered to Maoism. Again, in Canton the Li Yi-che movement (Li Yi-che is thought to be the collective signature of the leadership of the Red Guards who have returned from the countryside, they are probably linked to the Sheng Wu Lien faction of the cultural revolution) has raised the slogans “Down with the Red Capitalists,” “Down With Socialism in One Country” and “For True Workers’ Democracy”. One of the leaders of this movement was arrested two years ago for putting up wall-posters calling for revolution, but had to be freed under popular pressure!
In the last few weeks reports have reached the west through Hong Kong, of a new wave of strikes and the looting of state arsenals, together with increased state repression.
This points to the central reason for the speed of Hua’s moves against his opponents. The greatest danger for him is the development of a political vacuum. However, despite Hua’s coup and the increased repression, the workers of China will be heard. There is no way that their interests can be met by the policies of “Socialism in One Country” be it with a radical or moderate face.
As the political and economic crisis in China develops the divergence of interests between the different classes will become clearer. For the workers the way forward lies in total opposition to the policies of the regime, for the creation, once again, of a revolutionary proletarian party opposed to the concept of socialism in one country, the formation of a militia controlled by soviets, a revolutionary alliance with the poor peasants and the destruction of the bureaucratic state capitalist regime that stands between them and the creation of a Chinese workers’ state.
