The rise of Stalinism in Russia was heralded and consolidated by an attack on Trotsky’s theory of permanent revolution. Trotskyism was contrasted to Leninism in order to give credence to the new ‘official’ version of Leninism. The object of Loizos Michail’s pamphlet is not fundamentally different, although it is perpetrated in a more veiled fashion.
In Michail’s version of events we find Lenin the wily empiricist, a man concerned with ‘the concrete analysis of the concrete situation’, with the ‘uniqueness’ of each new turn of events. Trotsky takes the stage as something resembling a brash astrologer, given to wild and unfounded predictions concerning the future course of the Russian revolution. Lenin, we are informed, used Marxism as a tool to shed light on each new situation whereas Trotsky constructed his theories of logical deductions from abstract categories. Thus Trotsky comes to occupy the same ‘theoretical space’ as the Mensheviks, the only difference being that Trotsky was rather more optimistic about the possible outcome of the proletarian dictatorship than were the Mensheviks. In this way Michail succeeds in reducing Leninism, and consequently Marxism, to the level of empiricism. This should come as no surprise when we remember that the ‘Eurocommunists’ justify their slide into reformism by reference to the ‘uniqueness’ of post war capitalism.
It is certainly true that Trotsky had a number of differences with Lenin in the period 1903–1917. The most important of these concerned the centrality and method of building a revolutionary party. This difference was resolved in February 1917 when Trotsky, to use his expression, ‘Leninised the theory of permanent revolution’ through a recognition of the role of the Bolshevik Party. (Contrary to Michail’s claim Trotsky does not argue that Lenin was won to his strategy between February and October 1917 — rather it was the case that Trotsky incorporated Leninism into his theoretical armoury.) It is true, however, that Lenin and Trotsky had differences on the possible role of the peasantry and the possible outcome of the bourgeois revolution prior to 1917. It is upon these differences that much of Michail’s argument rests.
‘The error of Trotsky’s analysis’, Michail writes, ‘arose from the contention that the nature of class relations in Russia… laid the whole burden of the bourgeois revolution upon the shoulders of the proletariat.’ Michail goes on to argue that Trotsky gave no role to the peasantry prior to the seizure of power by the proletariat. This is essentially a false characterisation. What Trotsky did say was that the peasantry, due to its atomised and heterogeneous nature could not form a coherent, independent strategy for completing the tasks of the bourgeois revolution. Thus it could be won by either the bourgeoisie or the proletariat. It was therefore essential that the proletariat placed itself at the head of the peasantry in the struggle against the autocracy. In a leaflet written in 1905 Trotsky argues:
‘Is it thinkable to introduce socialism in Russia immediately? No, our countryside is far too benighted and unconscious. There are still too few real socialists among the peasants. We must first overthrow the autocracy, which keeps the masses of the people in darkness. The rural poor must be freed of all taxation, the graduated progressive income tax, universal compulsory education must be introduced; finally, the rural proletariat and semi-proletariat must be fused with the town proletariat into a single social democratic army. Only this army can accomplish the great socialist revolution. Here Trotsky outlines a proletarian programme capable of answering the needs of the peasantry — one which can draw them into the struggle behind the proletariat.’
Was Lenin’s position fundamentally different? No, it was not. It is true that Lenin did not consistently foresee the fusion of the proletarian socialist and bourgeois revolutions as completely as Trotsky did. However, Lenin at no time separated the struggle against the autocracy from the struggle for socialism. Lenin recognised that in the fight to overthrow the autocracy the proletariat and the peasant masses had a community of interests, thus an alliance could be forged. This alliance rested not upon programmatic concessions by the proletariat to the peasantry but upon the winning of the Marxist understanding of the tasks of the Russian bourgeois revolution. The struggle for the democratic republic, in Lenin’s view, was inseparable from the struggle for socialism precisely because the establishment of such a republic laid the basis for open warfare between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, a war in which the bourgeoisie elements of the peasantry would be shattered. Thus in ‘Two Tactics of Social Democracy in the Democratic Revolution’ Lenin argues that the proletariat should be:
‘At the head of the whole people, and particularly of the peasantry — for complete freedom, for a consistent democratic revolution, for a republic! At the head of all the toilers and the exploited — for socialism!’
As a result of this strategy Lenin at all times stressed the need for complete independence of the proletariat from all bourgeois and petty-bourgeois elements.
Where then is the dichotomy between Lenin and Trotsky? In purely theoretical terms it can be argued that Lenin in his formula of the ‘Revolutionary-Democratic Dictatorship of the Proletariat and the Peasantry’ diverged from Trotsky in assigning the peasantry an independent role. Indeed Trotsky did argue that such a democratic dictatorship was not possible since the bourgeoisie revolution could only be completed by a dictatorship of the proletariat resting on the peasantry. However, it was the recognition by both Lenin and Trotsky of the inseparability of the bourgeois and socialist revolutions and therefore of the need for an independent proletarian programme that allowed the two to come together politically after the February revolution.
Michail’s attempt to produce a fundamental rift between Lenin and Trotsky from the role of the peasantry is as absurd as his attempt to place Trotsky in the camp of the Mensheviks. The Menshevik strategy was dominated by a mechanical application of crude Marxism to Russian conditions. They believed that Russia would first have to pass through the stage of capitalism before socialism was on the agenda. The role of the social democrats was one of ‘extreme opposition’ in a bourgeois republic — a role of keeping the bourgeoisie in check. In course of course meant the complete subordination of the proletarian programme to that of the bourgeoisie. The proletariat could not consider seizing power for fear of frightening the bourgeoisie and thus contributing to the failure of the revolution. It is true that Martynov speculated upon the possibility of the social democrats finding themselves in power but the core of the Menshevik strategy was that this should not occur.
How then is it possible to place Trotsky, who argued for the absolute necessity of a proletarian seizure of power if the revolution were to survive, alongside the Mensheviks? Indeed, it is clear that this is not possible. The fact of Trotsky’s opposition to the Mensheviks being virtually ignored by Michail says it all. Here, Michail’s method of ‘concrete analysis’ virtually disappears. For mysterious and unaccountable reasons Trotsky did not find himself in the bourgeois government — he joined the Bolshevik party. The unity of Lenin and Trotsky was now demonstrated in practice. Lenin had recognised as long ago as 1905 when he wrote ‘Two Tactics of Social Democracy’ that the democratic dictatorship would inevitably be superseded by events. Trotsky had been proved absolutely correct in his assessment of the balance of class forces in Russia. The February revolution was the partial completion of the bourgeois revolution but on the basis of the Menshevik–Social Revolutionary–Cadet government it was not possible for the revolution to advance further — indeed there was an overwhelming threat that the gains of that revolution were about to be liquidated. The responsibility for the completion of the revolution rested squarely on the shoulders of the proletariat — both Lenin and Trotsky recognised this, the Mensheviks did not. As far back as 1905 Trotsky had argued that the completion of the democratic revolution by the proletariat would require the implementation of socialist measures to protect the proletarian dictatorship. In September 1917 Lenin, in his article ‘The Impending Catastrophe and How to Combat It’ argued:
‘It is impossible to stand still in history in general, and in wartime in particular. We must either advance or retreat. It is impossible in twentieth century Russia, which has won a Republic and democracy in a revolutionary way, to go forward without advancing towards socialism. Is this not clearly an application of the tactics of permanent revolution?’
As I have demonstrated Lenin and Trotsky did not occupy different ‘theoretical spaces’. Trotsky’s theory, far from being teleological, was based upon an application of Marxist theory to the specific conditions of the Russian economy in the early part of the twentieth century. To try and argue that Trotsky’s theory, grounded as it was in the theory of combined and uneven development, was fundamentally the same as the stagism of the Mensheviks is simply ridiculous. To argue that Lenin simply adapted himself to each new turn of events is also ridiculous. A Marxist programme flows from an understanding of the specific epoch of capitalism (ie imperialism) and finally from an understanding of the period of capitalist development and the unique features of particular situations. It was this methodology which guided both Lenin and Trotsky as distinct from the Mensheviks who did indeed proceed from logical deductions from the abstract category of bourgeois revolution. In short, Michail’s pamphlet is simply a reflection of the liquidation of Marxism to empiricism which has taken place throughout the ‘Eurocommunist’ parties — the fact that this liquidation is dressed up in Althusserian garb does not in the least alter matters.
