By Martin Suchanek, ArbeiterInnenmacht, Berlin
The Christian Democrat leader Friedrich Merz will almost certainly be the next Chancellor of Germany, probably in a ‘grand coalition’ with the Social Democrats (SPD). With a high turnout (83%), the CDU/CSU conservatives came top with 28.5% of the vote, up 4.2% since 2021. They will have 208 members in the 630-seat parliament, the Bundestag.
As was predicted by everyone, however, the headline news of the 23 February election was the success of the far right Alternative for Germany (AfD) doubling its vote to 20.8% on a platform centred on ‘remigration’, i.e. expelling 3.5 million who have some form of legal status. With 152 seats in the new Bundestag, they will be difficult to ignore, especially if the CDU/CSU and the SPD clash over major issues.
Alarmingly, AfD performed well above average among people in poor economic circumstances (39%) and amongst workers (38%) and the unemployed (34%). It was also the second strongest party amongst 18 to 24-year-olds.
The SPD suffered a historic defeat, down to 16.4%, a loss of 9.3% and with 120 seats the lowest score in a free election since the 19th Century. The party lost heavily among blue- and white-collar workers (12% and15% respectively) and amongst the unemployed, too (13%). Its leader, Olaf Scholz, was the Chancellor in the unpopular ‘traffic light coalition’ (SPD, FDP, Greens).
The FDP, who pulled the plug on the coalition over the budget (not hard enough for this neoliberal party) suffered a well-deserved and shattering blow, falling by 7.1% to under the 5% threshold, meaning they do not retain a single seat in the new parliament.
The Greens, too, lost votes but significantly less than the SPD and FDP. This is because they have a social base among the salaried middle classes and the labour aristocracy. They also represent a ‘liberal’ minority faction of capital that shares their mixture of aggressive war policies, despite the Green New Deal and pseudo-democratic humanism. Interestingly, they lost 700,000 voters to the Left Party, which is mainly due to a movement of young voters away from the Greens.
So, Germany has clearly moved sharply to the right, confirming an international phenomenon, most starkly posed by the first weeks of Donald Trump’s presidency and his vice president JD Vance and the world richest man, Elon Musk, who openly endorsed the AfD before the vote.
Die Linke
The result for the Left Party (Die Linke) was the only bright spot. With 8.8% of the poll, up by 3.9%, and with 4,355,482 votes they have 64 parliamentary seats. It did exceptionally well amongst 18 to 24-year-olds, with 24% (up 17% compared to 2021). In particular 37% of young women voted for them. Obviously, this reflected their role in mobilising mass demonstrations against the AfD and the CDU/CSU collusion in parliament to pass a (non-binding) anti-migrant motion.
Also, Die Linke did set out a markedly contrasting programme to the other parties: calling for a fight against social inequality, taxing the rich, lowering rents and subsidising public transport. It has recruited 30,000 new members since 2023 and the split with the right under Sahra Wagenknecht. Her party failed to beat the threshold.
Millions voted for Die Linke because it is perceived as the only opposition to neoliberal attacks, cuts, militarisation and racism. Its left-reformist programme, which promotes the welfare state, social redistribution, disarmament and pacifism, corresponds to the aspirations of these voters. In addition, it plays an active role in social movements and tries to present itself as an ‘activist’ party.
However, it has no strategy for pushing through its proposals against the resistance of the ruling class, except through what it calls ‘rebellious’ co-governance on a provincial level. But, where co-governs, as in Bremen and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, it continues to tacitly accept deportations and go along with cuts.
Although its influence in the trade unions has increased, it stubbornly refuses to fight the social democratic-led bureaucracy politically or even to put pressure on it. Instead, it hopes to take over the apparatus itself in individual unions.
Die Linke focuses, albeit one-sidedly, on so-called ‘social issues’, such as the fight against extortionate rents, against price rises and for uplifts in social security. But, at the same time, it tries to avoid other key issues. Although it presents itself as anti-racist and anti-fascist, it does not see the fight against racism and fascism, for equal rights for all migrants and refugees, as an integral part of a united struggle.
In this area, it pursues a policy of cross-class, popular front-like alliances (right up to the imaginary ‘left’ wing of the CDU) and rejects the fight for open borders, full citizens’ rights and the establishment of self-defence structures against racist and fascist attacks.
Yet its tens of thousands of new members and over four million voters do represent a potential force for resisting the attacks of the bosses, the next government and the threat of the far right. Left Party members and their youth movement, Solid, can play a big role in standing up for migrants under attack.
Revolutionaries must work to get them moving in the workplaces, in the unions and on the streets. This will in turn make it possible to mobilise broader layers of the class, bring about a change of course in the unions, re-energise dissatisfied members and voters of the Social Democrats, the Greens and even non-voters, and bring them into active opposition to their parties.
