By Jeremy Dewar
AT THE beginning, it looked like a military coup, with its architect, General Constantino Chiwenga, Commander of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces, appearing on state television on 14 November, dressed in army beret and fatigues, to reassure the people rather unconvincingly that, “This is not a military takeover.”
A week later, it looked more like a palace coup, with an emergency meeting of ruling party Zanu-PF removing Mugabe as its leader and replacing him with Emerson “The Crocodile” Mnangagwa. It was only the following day, on Monday 20 November, that the country’s parliament accepted the resignation of Robert Mugabe, who had reigned supreme for 37 years. Zanu-PF immediately nominated Mnangagwa and he was duly sworn in on November 24.
Faction fight
The roots of the coup lie in the accelerating attempt by the Generation 40 – or G40 – faction of post-liberation struggle leaders in Zanu-PF to push the old guard – and in particular Mnangagwa – aside. When G40 leader “Gucci” Grace Mugabe encouraged her husband to sack Vice-President Mnangagwa, and replace him with herself, the coup-plotters, who had been planning since September, swung into action.
While Mnangagwa fled to South Africa after he was sacked on 6 November to reassure President Jacob Zuma, and thus the other Southern African Development Community leaders, that their interests would not be harmed, Chiwenga flew discreetly to Beijing to receive the nod from the Chinese.
The G40 faction does not appear to have any distinctive political or economic strategy and to be motivated primarily by greed. That visit to Beijing, however, confirms that the “Lacoste” faction, so named from the crocodile logo of that brand, led by Mnangagwa and Chiwenga, represents an essential continuity with Mugabe’s policy.
With Zimbabwe facing a crisis of financial liquidity and an unemployment rate of up to 90 percent, it is likely that the new leadership will encourage greater foreign, especially Chinese, investment in the country as a source of sweat shop labour and raw materials.
While much has been made of “Gucci” Grace Mugabe’s shopaholic reputation, both Mnangagwa and Chiwenga are also unbelievably wealthy. In fact, Wikileaks reports a 2001 cable from the US Ambassador estimating that Mnangagwa was the richest man in Zimbabwe, even richer than Mugabe. Since then he is widely believed to have profited from diamond looting in eastern Zimbabwe’s Marange fields, utilising his position as Defence Minister. To that can be added, as a UN report does, illegal mining in DR Congo while the ZDF was “peace-keeping”.
But Mnangagwa is most notorious for his role in organising and commanding the genocide of 20,000 Ndebele people in Operation Gukhurahundi between 1982 and ’85, and as the Zanu-PF enforcer who sanctioned the murder of dozens, and terrorising of thousands, of trade unionists and Movement for Democratic Change supporters before, during and after the 2008 elections, which were initially won by Morgan Tsvangirai’s MDC.
Discredited and repressed
So how come thousands poured onto the streets to welcome soldiers and even Mnangagwa as soon as it appeared Mugabe’s days were over? Partly because of the intense hatred for Mugabe and his wife Grace. Partly because in heady days of sudden and unforeseen change hope is very often high. More fundamentally it was because of the abject failure of leadership by opposition leaders Morgan Tsvangirai and the Movement for Democratic Change MDC.
Tsvangirai, is a former mine worker and secretary of the mineworkers’ union and then of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU). He was also a prominent senior member of the ZANU-PF executive before breaking with Mugabe. In the late ‘90s, trade unionists began a series of militant struggles against the worsening economic conditions. There was talk of forming a workers’ party but, instead, in 1999, Tsvangirai and ZCTU formed the MDC, a block with big business and white farmers, still smarting from Mugabe’s confiscation of their land to distribute to ZANU-PF war veterans.
In 2008, Tsvangirai stood in the first round of the presidential election, even the much-delayed official result gave him 48 percent against Mugabe’s 42 percent but he pulled out of the second round because of the level of intimidation. His programme, at a time when the trade unions were launching general strikes against hyperinflation and mutinies broke out against non-payment of soldiers’ wages, accepted the austerity policy of a structural adjustment programme drawn up by the IMF. He also reassured Britain that white farmers would benefit from a reversal of land reforms.
It came as no surprise when in 2009 Tsvangirai accepted the nominal title of Prime Minister in return for a power-sharing agreement in which Zanu-PF held all the power. This, combined with the iron fist of Mugabe’s hated police and party henchmen, drew the sting of the opposition. In 2013, Zanu-PF won elections and Tsvangirai was sent packing, having played out his role of demobilising the workers’ movement.
Whether he is set for a reprise in a government of national unity is yet to be seen; his token inclusion in government might be an advantage in selling the “new” Zimbabwe to the West, though Xi Jinping’s pledge to export China’s development model would not be violated by Zanu-PF and the military holding on to absolute power. Certainly, Mnangagwa has promised “free and fair” elections in 2018, but that gives him considerable scope to present his new image and to organise Zanu-PF for a victorious election campaign.
Working class party
However, that year also buys democracy activists and militant trade unionists time to organise. They must use it to break from the MDC and launch a new working class party, based on the trade unions, community organisations and socialist groups.
There is no capitalist solution to Zimbabwe’s crisis or, rather, the only solution on offer is the further economic colonisation of the country by China or the West. Zanu-PF might prefer the former and the MDC the latter; or they might try to play the two off against one another. In both versions the working class would pay the price. In both versions the army will stand in the shadows, since the MDC would be powerless to prevent its intervention.
Red Flag believes that a workers’ party on the other hand should adopt a programme of permanent revolution, combining agitation over economic demands with actions to win and secure democratic gains, including most importantly the right to organise and hold political meetings. Crucially, it must maintain its political independence from the rival imperialist powers, whether that is China, the UK or the US, who will now seek to exploit the post-Mugabe situation.
Fraternisation with soldiers, building defence of communities against police and Zanu-PF thugs, organising strikes and boycotts to secure the economic means to live… socialists must ensure that they are at the heart of all these tasks, giving practical leadership, while also winning recruits to the revolutionary liberation of Zimbabwe from imperialism, 37 years after Mugabe sold it all out for a place at the top table.
